创业公司CEO 54点大忌：穷酸的穿着、和猪辩论、炒人太慢
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54 Screwups as a Startup CEO
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作为这家公司的CEO，到了年终自然也有个人的反思和总结。在这一年的时间里，他将自己所犯的失误以及遗憾列成了一个清单。现在他将这个单子分享出来，告诫自己在下一年不会再犯同样的失误，团队能够通过这篇文章监督它、同时身为创业者的你更可以通过对照，自我检视来少走很多弯路。
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年终了!是时候做个年终总结了!CB Insighs 这一年收获颇丰!收入上去了!团队规模扩大了!我们站到了新的台阶上!
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We’re having a pretty great year at CB Insights — revenue is up, the team is growing and we’re executing at a high level.
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但不是什么事都事事遂心的。
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But things weren’t always good.
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我们并没有达到「精益生产」，并且犯了好多的错误。很多都是由于我的原因，要么是我做错的事，要么是我忽略做的事，我还将其一个个地列到单子上，以示提醒。
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We’ve had lean times and made many, many mistakes. Most were the result of things I did (or didn’t do) and I’ve been keeping a list of my screwups.
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有了之前的这个做法，再加上新年马上就要来了，我想我应该把我的这份清单公布于众，希望我的团队能够按照这个单子里面所说的来要求我，规诫我;更希望其他创业者们能够以此为戒。我希望这个单子对你们有用，最起码能够证明了你不是唯一一个犯下这类错误的人。
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With that in mind, and as the new year approaches, I thought I’d share my list more publicly to serve as as a reminder to myself and as a public way for the team to keep me honest. For other entrepreneurs, I hope this list is useful, provides a laugh, or lets you see that you’re not the only one.
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你猜的没错，我所犯下的错误涉及开办一个公司的方方面面，从人力资源到公司文化;从产品设计到公开销售;从运营到管理。我就是你嘴里所描述的那种「多才多艺的人」。底下的序号没有任何明确的含义，只是做了类别上的划分。你甚至会注意到其中的一些点是相互冲突矛盾的。没办法，现实就是这个样子的。创办一个公司的过程是复杂的，你无法提供一种非常明确，且有最强可执行性的方式方法。
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As you’ll see, my screw-ups span all facets of building a company — everything from HR to culture to product to sales to operations to admin. I am what you might call “multi-talented.”
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那就让我们现在赶紧开始吧!
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So here they are in no particular order, bucketed by category. You’ll notice that some of these screw-ups sorta contradict each other. Yup — building a company is messy.
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文化
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Culture
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1.觉得「企业文化」会自然而然地到来
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#1 — Thought culture would just happen
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当 CB Insights开始不断壮大，这是我体会最为深刻的一点。我以前一直觉得我们只要雇佣了最聪明的人为我们做事，开发最酷的产品，让我们的顾客高兴，那么「企业文化」就是水到渠成的事。
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This is my biggest learning by far as CB Insights scales. I thought if we just hired smart people, built cool stuff and made customers happy, culture would just happen.
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后来的事实告诉我，如果你不去刻意经营你的企业文化，它也会自然而然的冒出来，但不是你想要的那个样子，这在后续你对公司的管理和运营上会产生很大的阻力。
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I learned that it would, but it wouldn’t be the culture we want. Building the operating system of the company the way we want is something that must be actively worked on.
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所以从一开始就要努力去营造整个公司的文化，同时去构建一种我们希望中公司运营体系。为此我们创建了一个名为「Culture Code」的 word 文档。每一个还没经历过穷苦日子(比如蹩脚的办公室，错误百出的产品)的新成员都可以将这个文档作为指引，了解我们期望他们成长为什么样，而他们又能从公司获得什么。
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As a step one, we’ve created a Culture Code doc. As new teammates join who’ve not seen the leaner times (crappy offices, product woes, etc), the culture code will serve as their guide on what is expected of them and what they can expect from the organization.
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2.并没有很好的在团队中进行 1 对 1 的交流
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#2 — Didn’t do enough 1 on 1′s with folks on the team
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经常展开的双向交流是至关重要的。我在这方面做的不是很好，这导致人们不太清楚他们目前在干什么;又或者因为我没有得到足够多的反馈，我也无法掌握公司前进的方向和速度。这种不断展开的双向交流在一个高速成长期的公司里尤为重要，因为在这个环境中一切人与事都处于相当不稳定的状态，说变就变。我之前所供职的一家大公司也存在缺少沟通的问题，这也给他们带来了很大的麻烦。那个时候我在年度述职总结会上开始回顾一年的工作，然后他们就会说：「你应该做这件事你应该做那件事!」我心里就在想：为什么你不在年初跟我说呢?!
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Regular feedback (both ways) is important. I didn’t do this enough which results in people not knowing how they are doing or me getting feedback on how I’m doing. This type of feedback loop is important especially in a fast growing company where things can change frequently. This lack of feedback was one of the challenges I saw when I worked in a big company. I’d get an annual performance review, and they’d say “you need to work on X” and I’d think to myself, “why did you wait till year end to tell me this?” Trying to remedy this.
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3.没有 360 °的沟通机制
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#3 — No 360 feedback
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前文说到没有双向沟通机制，所以我们公司就更不太可能有360°的沟通。它能够让团队里面的每个成员从各个角度得到反馈，如果我们想要获得成长的话就必须想出办法来优化这一切，使之更加方便可行。
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We never had asystematic way for teammates to give feedback to each other (and to me). It can be hard to deliver tough messages in person, but if we want to really improve we need to facilitate a way to do this.
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4.员工无法站在更高处来看问题
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#4 — Provide more context about company direction
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比如我们现在开始着手起草一份计划，我假设所有人都知道这件事的目的是什么。那么我认为最大的问题是大家只是忙于手头上的具体工作，又或者是坐下来侧耳倾听我在说什么。
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Since we sit in an open floor plan, I kind of assumed everyone knew what was going on because they can hear me and others. The problem with my logic is that everyone too busy *actually working* to sit around and listen to me.
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如果人们都是在关注着每周的进展，需要交办的具体工作，那么他们的概念里就缺失了一张更加宏伟的蓝图：比如我们要发展成什么样，为什么某个项目不能这么做。他们更没有机会去了解之前的工作有可能换另外的一种方式更好。回顾我之前的工作，我确实在这方面做的不够，没有让员工们站在更高的位置上去思考问题，解决问题。
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So while people are aware of the tactical week-to-week stuff, the big picture stuff about where we are going, why and how hasn’t been covered as well as it should have been. Looking back, I really underestimated the importance of the big picture stuff in providing context to the team to help them become more successful.
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5.没有让每一个员工知道所有人的工作进展
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#5 — Keep folks updated on everyone’s work
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有很多次，业务员一脸懵懂地面对新研发出来的产品，看着从来没见过的交互界面和新的功能不断弹出，这其实非常不好。
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There would be mornings when the biz dev would be doing a demo and see a whole new feature or improved interface on the product that they had no idea about before. This is not good.
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团队成员都不知道其他人在忙些什么，这很不好。因为让每个人知道团队里的各自分工和工作的具体内容会提升各自工作的完成质量。如果我们的研发团队正在做内容这一部分，那么我们业务员就必须要更加了解客户的心理;如果研究团队需要做一些视觉化上的设计，同样产品团队也应该知晓这一点。信息的沟通会让每个人都会受益。
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We just weren’t doing a great job of letting everyone know what others were working on. Knowing what others are working on is a good thing as it helps us do our jobs better. If our research team is doing content that our biz dev should know about for customers, that’s a good thing. If the research team is seeing a certain visualization take off, the product and dev teams should know about that. This exchange of information benefits everyone.
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6 .在面对新来的团队成员存在一些糟糕的做法
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#6 — Terrible on-boarding of new teammates
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我们让新来的人陷入窘境。比如让他自己准备一台自己的电脑;扔给他一个模糊不清的项目处理;又或者是临时起意让他向团队做一次自我介绍。这大错特错。现在想来我们之前的一些做法只能哑然失笑。
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We’d throw new teammates into the deep end. Setup your computer on your own, a nebulous project and ad hoc intros to the team. We’re scrappy, right? That goes with the territory.Wrong.
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后来，很感谢团队中 Jenuse,Forrest 以及Harrison的帮助，我们重新从上到下地梳理了整个新人加入团队的流程，虽然它还不是最完美的，但是新人已经在加入团队的时候获得了比起初好太多的感受。谢天谢地!
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Our “onboarding” process (it was generous to call it that) reminded me of this great HR joke I read on First Round Review with a punch line of “Yesterday we were recruiting you. Today you’re staffed.” I think you see where I’m going with this. The type of onboarding we did is so suboptimal, I can only laugh in retrospect that we thought it was ok. With the hard work of Jeneuse, Forrest and Harrison on the team, we’ve redone the onboarding process from top to bottom. It’s not perfect, but new teammates have a much better experience than folks used to. Thankfully.
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7 . 没有为每一个小小的进步加油喝彩
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#7 — Ring the gong more even to celebrate small wins
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一般情况下，公司不太会从默默无闻一夜之间就走红于天下。这不是一个非此即彼的选项，而是伴随着时间不断渐进的过程。从我作为创始人和CEO的角度来看，我们现在已经或多或少地取得了一些成功，不过前方还有很多的路等待我们完成。即便这样，这也不代表我们就不能庆祝现在所取得的每一个微小的成就，来庆祝站在今时今日的成就。
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Organizations don’t go from being unsuccessful to magically successful over night. It is not binary — there are degrees of success over time. From my point of view as a founder / CEO, we are moderately successful today, but….we could be a lot more successful. With that said, it doesn’t mean we shouldn’t celebrate small wins and accomplishments *today*.
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庆祝本身并不代表骄傲自满，原地踏步。相反，这是能够保证团队不断向上前进的动力，也保证所有团员都相信胜利就在不远的前方。
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Celebrating these doesn’t mean we’re less hungry or less focused on the end game. It’s just a nice way to recognize that we have momentum and ensure the team knows it.
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8.应该经常召集大家吃饭
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#8 — Eat together more as a team
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我们给团队每个人发放午餐津贴。所以每个人都在中午的时候从 Seamless叫外卖。因为我曾看到很多人都在餐厅或者厨房一样的地方头碰头一起吃饭，所以我觉得如果让大家更加频繁地围成一圈吃饭或许是一个不错的选择。当然当我们的队伍逐渐壮大的时候，这件事就越来越难办。不过在力所能及的时候我们还是尝试着这么做。
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We provide a lunch stipend for the team, so everyone orders from Seamless for lunch. While I’ve seen more and more folks grabbing lunch together in the kitchen area, I think getting the team together for lunch more frequently would be a good thing. It becomes logistically challenging as we grow, but there’s value in getting the team all together and doing this while we still can.
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9 .一厢情愿的认为他们能办的好，不给于足够清楚的指导和意见
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#9 — Didn’t give people clear enough instructions assuming they’d figure it out
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尽管我们将整个团队自夸为是「足智多谋」的，但这个形容并不能成为借口，让我们能够有理由把一切问题甩给员工去做，告诉他们「把这个办好了!」如果一开始就给出一些要求和建议，也许事情进展的会更加顺利。
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While we continue to prize resourcefulness, it’s not an excuse for providing half-baked directives and say “figure it out.” Getting better at fleshing out requirements for everyone is important as it will ultimately speed us up.
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人力资源及招聘
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Human Resources & Hiring
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10. 雇佣了一些聪明的家伙，然后对他们说：我们之后再想想你适合哪个岗位
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#10 — Hired smart folks and said we will figure it out later
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如果你是Google，手头上有一大堆的问题需要处理，这是一个很好的平台，里面人才济济，以备不时之需。这样做也许是一个很好的策略。但是在一个增长型的公司里，这并不适用于我们。在过去，我们确实雇佣了一些能力非常强的人，但是并没有给他们分配明确的职位，并希望在事情不断进展的过程中逐渐找到这些适合这些人才的角色。
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This might be an effective strategy if you are Google with lots of big problems and where you can just find a home for smart folks, but at a growing company, this hasn’t worked for us. In the past, we’ve hired really smart people without clear roles for them in the hope of figuring it out as we went along.
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我们的组织结构既不允许这样的事发生，我们也不太有时间来给这样子做。那些有能力的人永远都是想要掌控自己的职业生涯，更想变成自己期望中的那个人。「我们试着在飞翔的过程中为你寻找角色」这句话听起来是很有吸引力，在一开始的时候也足够鼓舞人心，但是它真的是一个大错特错的开端。
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We don’t have the organizational structure or time to figure this out, and it’s not fair to these teammates either. Smart people want to actively manage their career and have aspirations for where they want to be. We tried to figure things out on the fly, which may sound appealing and exciting in the beginning, but it never worked for us or them.
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11.迫于压力而招聘
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#11 — Hired under pressure
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每一次我觉得情势紧迫，觉得「我们真得需要一个人来填补这个职位上的空缺」，然后寻求各种捷径来找到这个人，每一次我这么做，最后的结局都不是那么美丽……
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Every time I’ve cut corners to fill a role or hired because I felt that “we really need someone in this role” it never has ended well.
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12. 炒人太慢了!
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#12 — Fired too slow
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我在开除员工这件事上总是犹犹豫豫，浪费时间，等好多起事件积压到了一起的时候还不采取行动。问题不是随着事件的流逝而自动消失的。如果一个大公司里，30人的团队里面有几个混饭吃的也许还说得过去，但是对于一个快速成长的科技初创公司而言，这根本是无法接受的事。我本应该在这些艰难的决策上做出更加果决的行动的。
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I have agonized over these decisions — wasting time, getting aggravated and just not taking action. Beyond the time lost, the work we needed done was not getting done. In a big company, having a team of 30 with some folks not holding their own is fine, perhaps. In a young, fast growing tech company, it’s unacceptable. I should have made the hard decision quicker and moved on with life.
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13.在招聘上没有打好提前量
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#13 — Poor anticipation of where we need to hire
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我从来就没有事先去规划整个项目到底在哪个环节需要什么样的人进来。结果就导致我们的招聘每次都晚于我们的项目需要，这也就意味着在项目的某些重要方面并没有合适的人第一时间进场来负责，从而影响了项目的整体进度。
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I didn’t always think ahead about staffing needs as I should have. As a result, we ended up hiring too late, which meant that certain key areas weren’t covered as well as they should have been.
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14 .在关键人员招聘上慢了一拍，失掉机会
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#14 — Moved slow on game-changing hires and lost them
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总有几次招聘得来的员工足以能够对大局会产生至关重要的推动作用。但是我在这方面总是慢上一拍，错失良机……
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I’ve talked to a few candidates over time who I really think might have been game changers. But I moved too slow or got bogged down on details and lost them.
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15. 对招聘有不切实际的期望
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#15 — Believed in the new hire messiah
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有些时候，我会投注更多的热情放在招聘这件事上。我一厢情愿地认为他们会自然而然地到来，然后就顺手就解决了我们长久以来存在的一些问题。这些固然是我对招聘的结果产生的美好期望，但这也是不切实际的，往往以我的失望告终。现在，我试着更加理性一些去看待招聘这件事，也许会有很棒的事出现呢?但是我绝不会完全指望招聘能帮我什么大忙了。
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I tended to “fall in love” with new hires and think they’d come in and magically solve some intractable problem we had. The problem is my expectations/hopes were unrealistic and I often found myself disappointed. Now, I try to have more reasonable expectations. And sometimes, I get surprised which is amazing. But banking on the new hire messiah is something I no longer do.
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16 .请千万注意不要把极品、奇葩、人渣这类人招进自己的队伍中
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#16 — Be careful of hiring the annoying or assholes.
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技能可以培养，性格则无法改变。
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Skills change, personality doesn’t.
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17.不看简历、也不知道如何看简历
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#17 — Didn’t check references and didn’t know how to do good reference checks
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有段时间，老实跟各位说，我招聘的时候都不带看简历的。这简直是太荒谬的事儿了，我也可以保证以后这样的事再也不会发生。
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There were times when I actually didn’t check references. What a royal F up. Never again.
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不仅我不看简历，我也不知道怎么看简历。我只是把这作为一种日常性的工作，团队给出的建议我不加思考的就盖上章子签上名字。现在我在查看简历的时候会提出一些尖锐的问题，并且从字里行间了解到更多的信息。一个指导性的、普遍适用的原则：如果这个简历里的内容并未让你真正兴奋起来，那么这个人就不会得到这个工作。
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Besides not checking references, I didn’t know how to check them. I just used to do them as a formality to rubber stamp a decision we’d already made as a team. Now I ask hard questions during reference checks and have learned to read between the lines. General rule — if the references are not effusive, the person won’t get an offer.
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18.太早开始与员工进行远程工作
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#18 — Experimented with remote workers too early
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在我们还没有理清工作流程和基础层面的业务运作的时候，我们就已经雇佣员工进行远程工作了。这是一个巨大的错误，我们本应该把这件事往后推迟一下，我们太早开始了……
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We hired remote workers before we’d really figured out our workflow and basic processes. It was a colossal failure. We may explore this again in the future, but we just tried it too early.
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19 .缺少与客户对接的职位
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#19 — Hired customer success earlier
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说实话，从一开始，我们员工的离职率就非常低，但是当我们进入到了产品研发的提速阶段，并没有一个人能够与目标客户对接，来保证我们所研发的各种新功能是否符合市场的需要。
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We had a really good retention rate from the beginning, but as we picked up the pace of product development, it hurt us not to have someone actively working to ensure customers were aware of new features to help them be successful with the product.
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让顾客来自己想出各种各样的功能那自然是不切实际的，这不是顾客需要做的事，而是我们应该考虑的问题。但是我们应该很早就开始与他们进行对接，让他们给与指导意见。
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Assuming customers will figure out new capabilities is not a reasonable expectation of them. It’s not a customer’s job to figure out how we can be valuable to them. It’s our job to do that.
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The other powerful aspect to customer success has to do with the idea of negative churn. I highly recommend reading these posts by Lincoln Murphy, Christoph Janz and Tomasz Tunguz if you’re not familiar with the concept.
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定价
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Pricing
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20. 觉得把价格定低一些会帮助我们获得商业上的成功
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#20 — Thought cheap pricing would help us win
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我们试着一开始就把价格定低一些，希望借此来获得竞争力。事实上当我们回顾过去才发现这是一个错误的决定。道理很简单：一个产品的定价其根本基础在于这个产品本身的价值，价格只能取决于它。现在我们对产品的售价已经提升到了刚开始的价格是十倍!这会帮助我们找到最适合这个产品的客户，并且也能够通过产品所实现的各种功能来满足这些客户的需要。
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We tried to compete on the price front when we started and in retrospect, it was the wrong dimension to compete on. Now, because we price based on value, our pricing is up more than 10x, which helps us focus on the right types of customers and product capabilities to serve their needs.
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21 .在定价上面玩弄一些华而不实的技巧
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#21 — Got too cute with pricing
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下面的这个截屏就是我们当初定价的页面。你是否听说过「Limo Plan」，当然没有。
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Below is a screenshot of an early version of our pricing page. Ever heard of a “Limo Plan”? Of course not.
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我想估计当时我大脑中的一部分是这么思考的：嘿人们会喜欢这样的页面的，估计还能达到病毒营销的效果，在网络上疯狂传播开来。哈哈!事实上这一切看上去傻极了。
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I think part of me thought people would just love this page and it would magically go viral or something like that. Ha ha. That was dumb.
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销售与营销
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Sales & Marketing
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22 .没有在销售上给予更多的关注
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#22 — Didn’t focus on sales enough
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我们从本质上来说就是一家科技公司，所有的增长是以产品功能作为驱动力的。如果我在一天的24小时里能够多出来一分钟的话，我都会用它放在产品研发上面。但是这种专注导致我们花了太多时间修补完善产品，而并不是在合适的时机迅速走出办公室，去面向市场打响 CB Insights的品牌。这方面的推进工作我做的实在不够，也让我们少赚了很多本应该从一开始就能赚到的钱。
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We are first and foremost a technology and product-driven company. If I ever had an extra minute in the day, I always gravitated towards doing product “stuff”. As a result, we spent a lot of time on product tinkering in the beginning instead of “getting out of the office” and selling CB Insights. My slowness in getting us selling has had bottom line impacts, in that we should have made a lot more money earlier than we did.
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23- 用一些专有名词来显得自己特别官方
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#23 — Tried to use jargon to sound bigger & more “institutional”
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「最优策略」、「协同」、「社会化」这些词听起来足够严肃、也足够官方，但是事实上根本不符合我们所要打造的品牌所应该有的调性。坦白来说，这些词只会让受众觉得冰冷、机械、枯燥。
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I seemed to think that using terms like “best practices” or “synergy” or “socialize” made us sound more institutional and serious. In reality, it isn’t consistent with the tone and brand we want to build and to be honest, it made us sound robotic, douchey and boring.
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这个道理在我们给特定用户发送的「时事电子通讯报」上就有所体现。后来我们改了另外一种行文风格，变得更加随意一些，就像人与人之间的说话那样，订阅者开始不断蹿升。到了2013 年的 2 月份已经达到了 1 万名订阅数量。到了 2014 年 5 月我们已经拥有了第 27,400 名订阅者，6 个半月后的今天，已经超过5万名订阅者。
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This has had a direct impact on our newsletter subscriptions. One of the reasons our newsletter has been growing so quickly is that we’ve adopted a more conversational tone and talk to people like people. In February 2013, it stood at 10k subscribers. By May 2014, we were at 27,400 and as of today (6.5 months later), it has grown to 50,000+ subscribers.
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当然，放弃掉官方语言并不是订阅者数量爆发式增长的主要原因，我们的数据研发中心所制作的以数据为核心的内容才是真正的原因。
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Of course, dropping jargon isn’t the only or primary reason for the growth of the newsletter (the data-driven content by our data science team is the main reason).
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24.曾经天真地以为通过缔结合作关系就能够解决销售渠道的问题
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#24 — Thought partnerships would solve distribution
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之前我曾经以为跟别人签一份协议，就能搞定销售这一块。他会帮助我们做营销。这个我预想中的交易花了很多时间来谈判，最后还是没做成。所以说，如果你不知道怎么靠自己把东西给销售出去，你又怎么能指望别人帮你来做这一件至关重要的事情呢?
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I thought our initial inability to sell could be solved by signing up partners who’d sell and market for us. These deals took time to strike and never worked. If we can’t sell the product ourselves, thinking someone else could sell it was the epitome of stupid.
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25 在前期测试阶段把反馈回来的错误建议视若珍宝
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#25 — Wasted time on poor quality leads
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大概每天平均下来我们要有 100 到 200 个测试用户对我们的产品进行体验。其中很多人都是我们目标客户。但是我们错误的把时间放在了每一个建议上。其中有一些建议是好的，但是还有一些是不那么适合于我们的产品的。于是我们就把时间这么硬生生地浪费掉了。
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We get between 100–200 trial signups per day on average. Many of them are in our target market and we used to waste time on every lead. This sounds so elementary in retrospect, but initially, we wanted to get everyone. The result of this with a small team was that we wasted time on bad leads and good leads sometimes went ignored.
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26.试着想琢磨出一个能够讨好所有人的定价方案
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#26 — Tried to have pricing that worked for all people
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当我们的公司于4年半以前成立的时候，我们本来想着你准备两套定价方案，以满足不同市场的需要。后来逐渐意识到我们必须细分市场，在某一个领域专注的深耕细作，我们的定价策略应该以此为主。
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When we launched 4.5 years ago, we tried to have institutional pricing as well as pricing for startups. I was afraid to pick a market because “having options” seemed like a good idea. We quickly realized that picking a market gives us clarity in our messaging and approach, helping us to narrow our market a bit.
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27.并没有在现实中见到足够多的客户
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#27 — Didn’t meet customers in real life enough
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在过去很长一段时间里，我都觉得私人面见并且促成销售是属于遥远的早已过去的年代中的事。但是后来我才明白去亲自与每一个客户面对面地打交道是多么重要的事。通过他们，我们可以了解到在产品上本应该做的很多事，我们的不足，我们应该改善的地方统统都会重新被发现。他们不仅对产品，同样对整个市场上也有着足够的见解。去多和他们面对面地沟通交流吧，你会给自己的企业注入不一样的新的活力。
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For a long time, I actually thought in-person meetings and sales were a relic of a bygone era. What I’ve learned is that providing a glimpse into where we are going provides us with fantastic insights into what we should be doing more of with our product and what we’re doing poorly. They also are great for providing us competitive intelligence and general market insights and often, they also lead to new business by virtue of referrals.
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其实这样的见面可以有多种形式。比如举办一次晚宴;又或者是邀请客户来公司坐坐，看看我们的产品研发团队。从各种形式下的会议上我们可以看得出来未来工作的重点应该放在何处。比如 PRE 的史蒂夫·霍夫曼(Steve Schlafman) 和 FirstMark Capital 的阿米什·贾尼(Amish Jani)来到公司，不约而同地谈到 CB Insights 在Chrome浏览器的插件他们经常都在使用。然而我们其实对这个插件给予的关注不够，这件事让我们重新开始在这个方向下大工夫，使得我们的产品变得更有价值。
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These interactions take various forms. Sometimes, it’s a dinner like the one we hosted with 10 corporate M&A and strategy clients in San Francisco. Sometimes, it’s having customers come into the office to meet our product team to highlight what they’d like to see our product do more of / less of. With these customer meetings, we occasionally see common trends emerge which helps tell us what we should be prioritizing. For example, Steve Schlafman of RRE and Amish Jani of FirstMark Capital both came by the office and in our conversations, both independently mentioned the CB Insights Chrome Plugin as something they use frequently. We were not doing a lot to enhance the plugin in all honesty, but their feedback made us see that we should be doing more with the plugin to make it more valuable.
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28.在面对拒绝的时候掺杂了一些个人情绪
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#28 — Took rejection too personally
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如果在一个星期内我们签了5个客户，但是有一家拒绝了我们，我就会把所有的精力放在这一家身上，毫无疑问这完全会起到反作用。我本应该转头去和团队商量，怎么样我们才能在成功的案例中做到更好，然后继续上路前进。我本应该去庆祝我们已经成功获得了那5个客户。要知道，公司任何明显的进步，如果你作为 CEO 都不表现的为之高兴，这对于整个团队来说都是一个打击。
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If we signed on 5 new customers in a week but lost 1, I fixated on the loss. While churn is obviously an important lever in the growth of a SaaS company, my focus on the loss was counterproductive. I should have figured out with the team what we can do better in those cases and then move on. I should have also celebrated the victories we’d just had. Not getting excited about the wins is just not a good motivator for the team.
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29.试着成为一个能说会道的销售员
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#29 — Tried to be a “salesy” sales guy
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我在创办 CB Insights之前从来没有干过销售。一开始，我觉得销售嘛应该有专门的人来做，他们是销售员，不过不是我。我本身就有点儿内向，觉得这根本不适合我去做。但是有一次当我试着开始讲解产品，试着让他们相信我能满足你们的需要的时候，我才发现会销售其实是一个CEO 最应该会的基本技能。它能够让你对你的公司，以及你的产品更加具有掌控力，也更有说服力。
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I had never done sales before CB Insights. In the beginning, I thought sales had to be done in a certain sales-y, “sell ice to an eskimo” sort of way. That is not me. I’m an introverted guy by nature and trying to do this was a big giant fail. When I started “selling” by just highlighting my understanding of the client’s needs and challenging them to think of ways to do things better using us, things started to click.
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30.在销售过程中没有问足够多的问题
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#30 — Didn’t ask enough questions in sales conversations
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我本身并不是一个天生适合销售的人，也从来没有意识到销售人员的重要性。所以一直以来我对销售的理解就是我对我的产品做了介绍，顾客要么过来购买，要么不过来购买。其中最主要的方式还是电话销售了，你得不断地去跟客户说你的产品有多么多么的好，有哪些与众不同的功能。
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I’m not a natural salesperson nor had I ever really observed what really good salespeople do. So my view of sales was I give my pitch and the customer will or will not buy. What this meant was that in sales calls, I’d drone on and on oblivious to the client as my goal was to hit on my checklist of features.
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这种机械式的销售过程完全不是公司所需要的。
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The results of this robotic, talking at sales process weren’t great.
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后来，我开始专门找经验老道的销售员谈话，向他们请教销售的技巧。事实上，他们真的分享了很多有关销售的见解。我认为最有用的一个技巧就是不断的提出问题，然后使之发展成为一段对话。当我开始不断地提出问题的时候，我就能越来越了解到阻挡在这次交易路上的问题是哪些，当我不断地向客户提出「为什么你会这么觉得……」的问题的时候，客户会不断的在头脑中自动检索答案，直到最后无法自圆其说，或者作为销售员的我已经给出了最合理满意的解释的时候，以一句」为什么不亲自试一试呢?「作为结束语，彻底促成这样一次交易!
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Then, I started talking to people who’d done sales before who shared a lot of insights with me. The biggest was about asking questions and making it a dialogue or conversation. When I started asking questions that helped me understand their pain points, the conversations were much better and the results improved.
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31 演示视频并没有及时地跟上
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#31 — Poor post demo follow up
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其实我有一个特别棒的演示视频，但是并没有及时的推出让大家一睹为快，也就将一个手头很好的资源白白浪费掉。
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I’d have a great demo but would not follow up appropriately to ensure they were getting value out of their trial. This is a surefire way to have a sub-optimal close rate.
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32 在销售上没有做到开门见山，主动出击
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#32 — Didn’t ask for sale
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我之前一直觉得开门见山的给人们推介产品，请大家购买这款产品是一种非常不体面的举动。我的想法再一次被证明是愚蠢的。因为我发现如果我不开门见山的提出我的销售意愿，磨磨蹭蹭的迂回着来说话，就会将很多时间花在根本不可能成为我客户的人的身上。你所需要的快速清楚的回应，他到底对你的产品感不感兴趣，在对话中拖延绝不是好办法。
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I used to be hesitant to ask for the sale thinking it was somehow uncouth to do that. Again, this was foolish. By not asking for the sale, I dragged out eventual sales and also spent too much time on folks who had no chance of actually converting. Getting to no quickly is only 2nd best to getting a yes quickly. Dragging things on with a client is never useful or a good idea. Asking for the sale prevents this.
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33 .给有意向购买的准顾客的心里埋下疑虑的种子
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#33 — Would spoon feed objections to prospects
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不要给有意向购买的准顾客的心里留下哪怕一丝一毫的理由来让他们对购买感到迟疑犹豫。下面有一个我所经历的真实例子：
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Don’t give prospects a reason not to buy your product. I used to do this, and there is no good reason for it. Here’s an example from when I used to do this.
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我在举行推介会的时候给大家展示了一下有关 CB Insights 项目上 Investor Search(投资人寻找)的功能。之后我说了这样的话：
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I would demo Investor Search on CB Insights and at the end of demo’ing, I’d say something like
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「现在的搜索会告诉你在互联网有关的产业和项目中有多少活跃的投资人，但是它不会告诉你哪些人是最活跃的。我们在项目内部已经有了评级的机制，但是目前仍然在开发阶段，你现在还不能使用。」
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While this search tells you all the active investors in the Internet of Things, it won’t tell you who has been most active.
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其实，我们有关投资人搜寻的功能真的是很棒的工具，我还给所有人展示了只有 CB Insights 才能办到的一些事。但是我后面所说的话几乎彻底毁了刚才下的功夫。因为台下的听众知道了这个工具还不能干什么。他们在那个时候也许不是很关系它的功能，但是头脑中却充满了对这个产品的疑虑：「除了台子上这个先生所讲的无法办到的功能之外，这个产品是不是还有什么地方不是很完善呢?」
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We now have Rankings search on CB Insights to do this, but before we did, you couldn’t do it. That said, there was no point in me saying the above. Our investor search is a great tool, and I’d just shown the prospective customer something that only CB Insights can do. But I negated all that by telling them about something it couldn’t do. They might not have even cared about that capability, but I now planted a seed of doubt in their mind and probably made them wonder “What other things can’t CB Insights do?”
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所以那个时候我完全没有理由去补充那么一段话。有意向的顾客会主动前来询问这个产品是否能够满足他们的需要，如果他们实实在在的问到了，那么你就坦诚相告，告诉他们哪些功能是可以实现的，哪些又是不可以实现的。但是在一开场的介绍中就给了顾客不去购买产品的理由，这实在是太不明智的举动了!
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There was no good reason to do this. Prospective customers are going to ask questions about whether the product will meet their needs. When they do, we should answer honestly about what is possible or not possible. But giving customers reasons to not buy the product was a very bad sales strategy.
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34. 忙碌的花费时间寻找能够获得新客户的新渠道，而并没有好好充分利用已经奏效的那些渠道
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#34 — Wasted time trying to find new customer acquisitions channels. Didn’t exploit what worked.
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我花了很长时间来思考怎么样通过新的渠道来获取客户，与此同时就忽视了对现有很多渠道的充分开发利用。之前我们经常给公众发研报，因为上面有很多独家数据及其我们分析而来的原创内容，吸引来了不少人进行订阅。这些人都既希望发现下一轮的投资热点，又是苦于没有途径去找到数据并进行解读。这么好的一个营销渠道我不好好挖掘利用，不好好经营内容，反而去开发新的渠道，真的是天大的失误。
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I spent a lot of time thinking about new channels to acquire customers without exploiting what we were already good at. Our data-driven research content was inconsistently published, as was our newsletter’s cadence (though when we did it, it worked). This was driven by a lack of understanding our metrics as well as my desire to find the next new thing. As a result, we wasted time on new channels rather than sticking to content.
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后来我们意识到了这个问题，我们重新调整了营销方向，让我们在报告上的内容更加精彩。专门负责内容撰写的团队一共有 6 个人，在 2015 年的时候整个团队的人数将调整到 10 到 12 人。
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Once we realized this, we course corrected and now have a killer content / data science team of 6, which we’ll expand to 10–12 in 2015.
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如果你觉得你能够统领整个团队的话，我不介意让你来做总编辑。
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If you think you could head up the group, we’re looking for an editor-in-chief.
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35. 过早的把我们的工服 T 恤做出来，并且还发给了一些顾客。
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#35 — Gotten our sweet t-shirts earlier and send them to customers
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不过说实话我们的 T 恤挺酷的，就像是银行业务中负责高端理财的那群人一样。
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Customers love getting cool swag. And our t-shirts are very cool, as modeled by the sexiest team in banking.
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36.有一些人想要「和 CB Insights 进行整合」，我们在这些人身上浪费掉了太多的时间
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#36 — Wasted time with people who wanted to “integrate with CB Insights”
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有很多人都给我们发来信息，告诉我们他们特别想和我们合作，把我们的数据导入到他们的产品中，或者来和我们搞一次贴牌生产。其实和他们的接触中，我发现98%的时间都是花在了无用功上。我跟这些人打交道完之后最大的感触是：这些人要么现在手头上没有钱;要么这些人根本不知道他们想要什么，也不太清楚自己正在做什么事。
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We get a lot of inbound messages from folks who want to integrate our data into their products or who want to white-label our product. 98% of the time these have been giant wastes of time. Generally, I’ve found that people who propose convoluted business relationship structures often (1) don’t have money and (2) don’t know what they want or are doing.
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现在我已经可以提前判断出这类人群，并且敬而远之，以免让他们拖慢了我们公司成长的速度。
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I know now to pre-qualify these quickly and move on.
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37.对我们的技术表现的太过谦逊
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#37 — Have been too modest about our technology
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我们的做事风格就是举重若轻，把很多难的事儿办成了，让别人觉得是轻而易举的。我们也自我感觉良好，甚至还有一点点的小骄傲。但是这也错了。我之前的错误想法是：用户只管你做出来的东西是什么，而不去管你到底是怎么做出来的。后来我看到很多公司喜欢搞一些时下最时髦的词汇，比如「机器学习」啊，又或者「大数据」啊，然后客户们就会表现的特别兴奋。
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This one sounds like a humble brag I know. But hear me out: We take a lot of pride in making hard things look easy because I wrongly thought the customers didn’t care how the sausage was made. But I’ve learned that they do. I’ve seen companies drop marketing buzzwords around Machine Learning and Big Data into their pitch and watched customers really get excited about those things.
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所以我们也得在方式方法上做一番考虑了，固然我们可以不用去媚俗地去追求那些时髦概念，但是我们可以更多的谈谈为了获得财务和并购方面的数据，我们在「数据挖掘」上面的工作，以使得外界对我们的工作产生足够多的兴趣。
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So while we don’t lead with the buzzwords, we’ve started talking more about our data mining technology to get our financing and acquisition data or about the science behind our content marketing efforts.
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另外一点也值得注意：如果我们不强调我们的技术优势，这也会间接地给我们的招聘工作带来阻碍。
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In addition, by not emphasizing our technology, we also were probably hurting our recruitment efforts.
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38.媒体曝光度严重不够
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#38 — More proactive outreach to journalists
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我们似乎得到了一些媒体的报道，但是不足够。每天这个世界上会出现多少新奇的、值得关注的公司和项目?我们应该更加积极的去联系这些媒体记者，而不是稳坐在家中等着他们上门拜访。
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We get a fair amount of press, but there are lots of interesting trends and insights about companies and investors we see pretty early. We should be proactively reaching out to the media with ideas, rather than waiting until they inquire.
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产品
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Product
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39.从非客户的人群(事实上他们也绝不可能在日后转化成我们的客户)那里获取意见
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#39 — Took advice from non-customers (who would never be customers)
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不是所有的反馈我们都不加甄别的照单全收。这是要看出处的。对于那些已经成为我们客户的人群，又或者是已经拥有了足够良好的信誉，并且有意向成为我们客户的人群来说，从他们那里获得的意见绝对是弥足珍贵的;除此之外，其他一些有关数据挖掘方面的创业者所给出的建议更加值得听一听。但除了这两部分人之外，其他旁观者的话完全是在浪费你的时间。
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Not all feedback is created equal. Feedback from existing customers or credible prospective customers is worth a lot. As is advice from people who’ve done something similar to us, i.e. entrepreneurs who built or scaled SaaS or data companies. But taking advice from folks outside of those camps has generally proven to be a waste of time.
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我想马克·库班(Mark Cuban)的以下的这句话非常适合总结这一点：
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I think Mark Cuban’s thoughts on this are sound:
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这世上永远不缺乏喜欢指手画脚的人，更关键的是他们对提出的意见所造成的后果完全不会负责，对于这些人来说，他们的话你可以当做耳旁风。
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Never take advice from someone who doesn’t have to live with the consequences.
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40.逢迎潮流
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#40 — Chased fads
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追逐、逢迎当下最热门的概念，努力与时下最热门的话题挂钩，这样做无异于浪费时间。这就好比我们在游戏中获得的那些称号、徽章和荣誉，全都是浮云而已。有段时间我们也曾沉迷于此，但是我们还是错了。
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Chasing the flavor-of-the-month has always proven to be a waste of time. Remember when gamification and badges were the shit? I thought people wanted badges and gamification, so we worked on that. Wow, was I wrong.
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我曾经在一本书上读到这样的道理：一家初创公司往往并不是「饿死的」，而是「撑死的」。有段时间我总是被不断出现的新的机会所吸引，其实它们要么不值得我投入精力，要么就是机会太小，无法让人感兴趣。当然，最终等我们的公司变成一个庞然大物，我们也许会把握所有出现视野中的热门商机，但是目前我们只是一家小公司，一个团队内最多10 人 或者 15 人，最多不超过 25 人，我们必须有针对性的选择我们的战场，绕开那些分散我们注意力的领域。
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I read a line that startups fail more often of indigestion than starvation. There have been times when I’ve been distracted by new opportunities which were not worthwhile or just too small to be interesting. Eventually, when we’re massive, we’ll target all of those. But when we were a team of 10 or 15 or even 25, we needed to pick our battles and avoid the distractions.
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41. 我本应该早点发布一个「更加原生态」的产品出来的
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#41 — Should have shipped a “rawer” product
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一直以来我其实都挺担心看到负面评价的。这样就让我们花了太多的时间去修补完善产品的各种细节，而那个时候早应该就把产品放出来的。里德·霍夫曼(Reid Hoffman)的这段话拿出来最合适不过了：
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I’ve always been afraid of negative feedback. As a result, we spent too much time perfecting some key pieces of the product when we should have just shipped it. Reid Hoffman’s comment seems appropriate here:
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「如果你开发出来的产品的第一个版本无法让你觉得尴尬，那么你肯定太晚把产品发布出来了。」
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If you are not embarrassed by the first version of your product, you’ve launched too late.
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42.太过关注竞争对手的一举一动
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#42 — Cared about competitors too much.
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在过去的四年半时间里，在我们所处的这个领域曾经存在过几家竞争对手，大公司也有，小公司也有。它们的资金比我们充足，动静儿也搞的比我们大很多。我曾经就紧张地盯着它们的一举一动，时至今日它们都彻底消失了，如今想来自己当时的做法实在可笑极了。
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In the past 4.5 years we’ve had several companies, big and small, enter our space. They’re always more well-funded than us and usually they’ve had a lot more fanfare. I used to get fixated on what they were doing, but over time, I’ve seen nearly all ultimately die. What I’ve realized in all of these instances is that my “fascination” with these startups is driven by ego.
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钱并不能购买到执行力。我们通过紧盯开发客户，满足客户的需求来达到这点。这才是真正为公司买单的人群，我经常忘掉这么重要的一点事实。
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Money doesn’t buy execution. We’ve gotten this far by focusing on customers — the people who pay us. I’ve stupidly forgotten this at times.
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43. 产品开发以竞争者的举动为导向，而非客户
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#43 — Product development driven by competitors — not customers
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正如上一点所说，正因为我太过关注竞争对手，导致我总是会有这样的想法：「噢!我们应该像某某家公司一样开发这种功能」。之后我曾经反思这样的做法，得出了下面两条原则：
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I’ve made the mistake of fixating on what a competitor does and thought “oh, we should do that”. That has always gone poorly. Two things I’ve learned from these mishaps:
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1) 如果我们以竞争者的举动，而非顾客的需要作为下一步行动的标杆，这永不会成功。客户付钱给我们，我只需要听到他们的声音，其他的都是扯淡。
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1) When we’ve done stuff in response to competitors and not customers, it has never gone well. Customers pay us. I need to listen to them and remember the rest is noise.
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2) 我相信我们的团队比竞争对手更了解这个市场，我们应该相信我们的直觉。
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2) Our team has a much better view of where the market needs to go than our competitors. We should trust our instincts.
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管理及基础设施
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Admin & Infrastructure
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44.我们待在一个憋屈简陋的办公室里太长时间
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#44 — Stayed in a crappy office too long
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我们刚开始的办公场所仅仅为一个 125 平方英尺(换算成中国的计量就是11.61平方米)的场地，这很奇怪，看起来好像我们都在过某种简朴的苦修士的生活，但这并不是问题的关键，关键是这种状态持续的时间太长了。
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We started in 125 sq ft and I think there is a weird part of me that likes the austerity of living humbly, but this went too far.
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最近我们又搬家了，上一个办公地点是 18 个人挤在 900 平方英尺(换算成中国的计量单位就是83.61平方米)的空间里。每到吃午饭的时候，大家把饭盒打开，各种各样的味道弥漫充斥在整个空间里，这足以让每个人都疯掉!这样狭小的空间也让团队与团队之间的协作几乎不太可能实现，更不用说这给新来的员工留下怎样的第一印象了。
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Before we moved recently, our last office for a time had 18 people in 900 sq ft. The smells from everyone’s lunch were enough to drive you crazy. Being in such close quarters made collaboration among the team impossible, not to mention it was definitely not a great first impression for new hires.
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45.并没有很快地将与工资结算及相关税费有关的财务工作交出去
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#45 — Didn’t outsource payroll soon enough
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以前我很长时间都是在自己一个人在纸上计算每个人的工资，然后我一个人在那儿辛苦地做扣缴税款申报工作。这是多么痛苦且漫长的经历啊!现在我们将这部分工作交给了ZenPayroll，它干的相当不错!
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I manually wrote checks and did the withholdings and filings on my own for way too long. What a pain in the ass. We’ve moved over to ZenPayroll which has been great.
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46.并没有及时的把糟糕的咨询顾问给开掉
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#46 — Didn’t fire bad advisors quickly
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顾问这个角色似乎就是专门给人解决麻烦的，听起来不错，但是事实上做起来并非那么简单。任何形式的顾问，无论是法律顾问、财务顾问、人力资源顾问等等，他们都在公司运作层面的某个领域拥有大量的知识储备，就因为这一点，在创业的时候把一个全新的领域交给顾问去打理真的好吗?
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Obvious sounding, but sometimes it’s harder to do than expected. Advisors of any kind (lawyers, accountants, PR, etc) often have a lot of knowledge about how things work and so when starting the business with one advisor, transitioning it to someone new may seem daunting. Because it is.
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在这方面你需要做到谨慎再谨慎，因为如果你遇到的是一个只会纸上谈兵的家伙，又恰巧他对创业领域一无所知，那么你应该立刻请他走人。如果你不能下定决心，拖得时间越久，积压的问题就会越来越多。他将公司带向歧途的程度也就越来越大。
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What I’ve realized over time is that waiting to fire a bad advisor to avoid this transition pain is a bad idea. The problems that come from having a bad advisor pile up quickly and will cause you more headaches down the road than the short-term transition pain. Some of our goto advisors are mentioned here.
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细节
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Miscellaneous
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47.穷酸的穿着
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#47 — Dressed poorly
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很长时间以来，我就一件西装外套。无论我上电视接受采访还是做其他对外宣传的活动，我就这么一件衣服。这其实不对。如今我已经在衣橱中添置了一些衣服，我想在未来穿着更加得体。
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For a long time, I literally had 1 blazer. So if I was going to buttoned-up event or doing a TV appearance, I was always rocking the same blazer. It was kind of absurd. I’ve since added a few more to my closet, but I suppose I should dress better to “look the part”. One day.
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48. 从客户那里购买商品
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#48 — Bought stuff from customers
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我这么做过几次，因为我想着对于那些用行动支持了我们的客户，我们也应该支持他们，这样大家实现双赢。但是其实事情并非我想象中那么简单。曾经购买的商品不断出错，使得我也花了冤枉钱。其实我应该把顾客的身份还原成一个卖家，基于他本身产品的真实情况来做出是否购买的决策，而不是因为他购买了我的东西，我就要选择购买他的。
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I did this a couple of times with the idea that we should support those that support us, and while it’s mostly worked fine, it does occasionally get messy when things don’t go well. In these instances, I should have done my diligence on them as a vendor as if they were not a customer and made my decision based on facts instead of just assuming they’d be a better vendor to us because of our pre-existing relationship with them.
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49.把朋友和生意混为一谈
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#49 — Got involved in sales to friends
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有一些我私交很好的朋友刚好就是我们的目标客户，然后我就错误地直接介入到了销售过程中。其实我认为应该有更好的一种做法：让公司的其他人来跟我的朋友进行对接，从而将私人关系从商业关系中剥离出去，这对公司和客户来说都是好事。
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I have friends who are in our target customer demographic and have made the mistake of becoming directly involved in the sales process. As a result, I’ve found it better to have someone else on the team sell these subscriptions as it depersonalizes things and forces smarter, more business-like decisions for both them and us.
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50.在互联网上理会那些喷子
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#50 — Responded to trolls on the internet
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尽管你也许会忍不住在网上回喷那些喷子，但是我在这里很负责任地告诉你，这并不值得。我很早之前就学会了这一点，
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As satisfying as you might think it may be, I’m here to tell you that responding to trolls is just never worth it. I now keep in mind the following adage:
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谨记：「永远不和猪辩论，否则你也会变脏变臭」的原则。
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I learned long ago, never to wrestle with a pig. You get dirty, and besides, the pig likes it.
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51. 创业起初我们起的名字并不太好
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#51 — Our initial name was not very institutional friendly
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我们之前的名字是 ChubbyBrain，这似乎很难让 Goldman Sachs 公司来订阅我们的内容。
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We started off with the name ChubbyBrain. Not an easy name to get Goldman Sachs to buy a subscription to. Only thing that might have been worse was this logo we considered for a bit.
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52 .把时间浪费在了「社交」上
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#52 — Wasted time “networking”
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我时不时地会收到邮件，人们约我出去喝个咖啡。这方面的社交浪费了大量的时间。我现在跟人会面要有一定的议程安排的，又或者是有一个非常清楚的理由。因为现在意识到只有这么做了，双方才能都享得益处。
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I get emails from folks to have coffee semi-regularly. I wasted a fair amount of time on these in the name of “networking”. I now push to have an agenda & objectives for the meeting so that it’s clear there is a reason to meet. While there is perhaps some “serendipity” lost by doing this, I’ve found that conversations with people who have a clear reason to meet are more productive for both of us.
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53 ,起初只是凭借「单向确认」(Opt-in)来添加订阅者
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#53 — Introduced people via the single opt-in
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「Opt-in」是一种最简单的用户许可方式，即用户主动输入自己的Email地址，加入到一个邮件列表中，就能成为某个订阅源的订阅者。单向确认的特点在于，网站无需给予Email通知。后来我们就改成了「双向确认」。这意味着网站会立即发出一封邮件通知给用户，如果用户不想订阅，或者并不是自己订阅的(比如他人输入邮件地址错误或者恶作剧)，可以按照确认邮件里的说明来退出列表，可能是点击某个URL，或者是回复确认邮件来完成。
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I quickly wised up on this after realizing these types of introductions are evil. I now only introduce people with a double opt-in introduction email. Trust me on this one.
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54 .在跟很多风投的接触中不了了之
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#54 — Half-assed VC meetings
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在创业的过程中，有很多风投给我打来电话，希望我跟他们聊聊，看「他们能帮上我些什么忙?」一开始，我觉得这只要是涉及投资的事儿，我就应该应邀前往。后来发现我并不是单纯的就为了钱而四处奔波。我既不了解这些风投的背景，更没有做好针对一次次会议应该有的准备工作。毫无疑问，每次的表现都令人失望，并没有让CB Insights和我的团队得到正确的评价。
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I took meetings with VCs who called us to talk about “how they can be helpful.” In the beginning, I thought when someone with money calls, you should take the conversation. The problem was that I wasn’t interested in raising money and as a result, I was not prepared for these meeting like I should have been. Unsurprisingly, I looked dumb and didn’t present CB Insights and our team the way they deserved.
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在跟投资人的接触中，不管这次对话有多么随意，你都不得不慎重对待。所以从一开始就想好到底是否去和他们接触。最好不要去见那么多的投资人，这无论是对创业人还是投资人来说都是在浪费时间，更让创业者远离了他的工作重心：他的产品以及他的客户。
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No matter how informal the conversation is, talking to investors requires putting on your game face. Not being into it, I shouldn’t have taken the conversation. It was a waste of time for both parties and took me away from what I needed to focus on — the product and our customers.
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最后的总结
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If you’ve made it this far, congrats. We’re hiring and our onboarding is pretty good now
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这54点大忌并不能完全囊括创业过程中所要规避的暗礁。我相信在未来的创业过程中，我还会遇到更多，但是我希望在这个过程中不会有大的闪失，更希望从中不断汲取经验使之更加强大，我希望团队对我能够保持一如既往的信心。
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I’ll be updating this post over time. Many more screw-ups to come I’m sure, but hopefully I’m learning and making new mistakes, and I hope the team will keep me honest.
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如果你在创业过程中有任何的自我反思，也欢迎给创见回信，我们将继续补全这个单子，使之成为所有创业人的创业指南。
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If there are other screw-ups you’ve seen in an emerging, fast-growing company that you’d like to share, leave them in the comments. Thanks for reading.
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